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PREFACE
Public Finance in Post-conflict
environments: A Policy Paper Series
In the wake of violent conflict, a key element of building
a durable peace is building a state with the ability to
collect and manage public resources. To implement
peace accords and to provide public services, the
government must be able to collect revenue, allocate
resources, and manage expenditure in a manner that is
regarded by its citizens as effective and equitable.
The tasks of revenue mobilization, budget allocation,
and expenditure management are bound together
by political imperatives as well as economic logic. To
collect revenues, the state must be seen as legitimate
in the eyes of its citizens. And to secure legitimacy, the
state must allocate resources and manage expenditure
effectively and equitably.
The need to build legitimate and capable states in wartorn societies is now widely recognized. The Principles
for Good International Engagement in Fragile States,
adopted by the development ministers of major donor
countries in March 2005, declares that statebuilding is
‘the central objective.’ This represents a striking break
from the prevailing wisdom in the closing decades of
the 20th century, when the state was widely regarded as
the problem. The state has been rediscovered: it is now
invoked as the solution.The policy rhetoric has changed
from downsizing states to building state capacity.
Yet little systematic work has been done on what
the international community can and should do to
strengthen the capacities of post-war states to mobilize,
allocate, and spend public resources.
This policy paper series, jointly published by the
Center on International Cooperation (CIC) at New York
University and the Political Economy Research Institute
(PERI) at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst,
seeks to redress this gap by presenting innovative
policy proposals targeting critical issues in postwar
public finance.
Building state capacities in public finance is crucial to
the success of peacebuilding efforts for three reasons:
»» First, governments must be able to ensure
sustainable funding for new democratic
institutions, for social programs that ease tensions
and redress grievances, and for public investments
to promote economic growth and development. In
the early post-war years, countries often receive a

large influx of external assistance that temporarily
can meet some of these needs. But aid typically
diminishes over time, so domestic resources
are necessary to sustain these institutions and
programs. A key challenge is to ensure that aid
does not ‘crowd out’ domestic fiscal capacities, but
instead stimulates their growth.
»» Second, fiscal capacities are needed to build a
legitimate state. Democratic elections do not, in
and of themselves, ensure state legitimacy. Neither
do ‘quick impact projects’ in which international
aid agencies seek to fill urgent needs. Legitimacy
comes in large part from government delivery of
services that people need and want. Elections
provide an avenue for the citizenry to voice
demands; responding to those demands requires
the capacity to mobilize, allocate, and spend public
resources effectively.
»» Third, in some cases there is a need to curtail extralegal taxation by ‘warlords’ and armed groups so as
to enhance security. In Afghanistan, for example,
control of border customs outposts is not only a
fiscal issue but also a security issue. Similarly, control
over revenues from natural-resource extraction,
such as logging in Cambodia or diamonds in West
Africa, is often crucial for establishing the state’s
monopoly not only in legitimate taxation but also
in legitimate force. At the same time, domestic fiscal
capacity is the only sustainable source of financing
for public security after external peacekeepers
have withdrawn.
The papers in this series offer policy proposals designed
to strengthen the fiscal dimension of statebuilding.
The authors draw on extensive personal experience
in public finance matters in war-torn societies, and
on lessons from comparative studies, including Peace
and the Public Purse: Economic Policies for Postwar
Statebuilding (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2007), the
outcome of the first stage of the CIC’s statebuilding
project. After a concise recapitulation of the problems
to be addressed, the authors concentrate on proposing
solutions that can be practically implemented.
We hope these policy papers will find a wide audience
amongst those who are grappling with the difficult
challenges of post-war reconstruction, and that the
proposals they put forward will assist in the twin tasks
of building legitimate and effective states and building
a durable peace.
James K. Boyce
Lead economist, Peacebuilding as Statebuilding Program
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Promoting Group
Justice: Fiscal Policies
in Post-Conflict
Countries
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Evidence suggests that economic inequalities –
particularly “horizontal inequalities” among groups
defined by ethnic, racial, linguistic, regional, and
religious lines – can generate social tensions and
fuel violent conflict. Well-designed fiscal policies
can help build a sustainable peace by working to
reduce these inequalities. This paper reviews some
challenges raised by analyzing the impacts of tax
and expenditure policies on inequality in postconflict settings, and makes recommendations
for incorporating distributional effects into fiscal
policy making.

The Challenge of Measurement
The first step in understanding the status and
dynamics of horizontal inequalities (HIs) is to
map the group boundaries that form the basis
for discrimination or favoritism. A careful scoping
exercise is needed to answer four key questions:
(1) Are the salient groups ranked hierarchically?
(2) Are they geographically concentrated, or
dispersed?
(3) Are they specialized in certain economic
sectors or activities?
(4) Does the government have the political
inclination to tackle inequalities?
After the relevant groups are defined, both income
and non-income dimensions of HI should be
measured. The latter include ownership of land
and other assets, employment, education, and
infant and child mortality. Simple comparisons
of averages – such as per capita income – can
conceal distributional differences within groups,
so comparisons at various points across the
distribution are also needed.

This paper proposes three approaches to tackle
these measurement challenges:
»»

Where data needed to measure horizontal inequalities are not available (or highly inadequate), small-scale household surveys should be
conducted to assess inter-group disparities in (a)
asset ownership; (b) employment; (c) incomes;
(d) education; and (e) health and nutrition.

»»

Where conflict-relevant group boundaries are
not evident, perceptions surveys should be
conducted on attitudes toward identities and
inequalities.

»»

In addition to regional and linguistic
categorizations, statistical offices should be
encouraged to include ethnic, religious, or
racial categorization (if relevant and politically
feasible) in subsequent data collection.

Taxation Policies
Tax policies in post-conflict settings can and
should aim not only to mobilize revenue but also
to address inequality. These aims are interrelated
as perceptions of tax-policy inequity can
undermine the legitimacy of the taxation
system and deter compliance, impeding revenue
collection. Addressing distributional issues by
making tax liability directly dependent on religious,
ethnic, or racial identity, risks strengthening group
divisions. Policies can be devised, however, to
increase progressivity and tax more heavily those
groups that are relatively privileged. To this end, the
paper recommends that policy makers:
»» Increase

the general progressivity of the
tax system by (a) increasing the role and
progressivity of direct taxes and property taxes,
and (b) increasing the progressivity of indirect
taxes by raising rates on luxuries and exempting
basic goods consumed by the poor.

»»

Design indirect taxes to bear more heavily
on privileged groups, by introducing taxes
or increasing rates on geographic areas and
production and consumption activities in which
such groups are concentrated.
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Expenditure Policies
Expenditure policies also can be designed to
redress HIs. People benefit from public expenditure
in the allocation of contracts and employment, as
well as in their access to public services.
Four relevant types of expenditure can be
distinguished:
(1) Expenditures with differentiated effects
on both inter-regional and intra-regional
lines, such as expenditure on infrastructure.
(2) Expenditures with differentiated
benefits across groups but not necessarily
across regions, such as airline subsidies.
(3) Expenditures with differentiated
benefits across regions but not
necessarily within regions, such as
expenditure on environmental quality.
(4) Transfer payments to specific 		
communities, households, or individuals.
To improve the distributional impacts of public
expenditures, the paper offers the following
recommendations:
»» In

the construction of facilities and delivery
of services, allocation of contracts and
employment should explicitly consider
fairness among groups. Potential policies
to promote this include competitive and
transparent bidding procedures for contracts;
“fair” employment legislation and rules; and
technical assistance and possibly quotas to
ensure equitable distribution.

»» The

distributional impacts of public services
should be monitored, and allocations made
to ensure greater horizontal and vertical
equity by targeting pro-poor sectors, activities
within sectors, and locations. In federal
or decentralized systems, revenue-sharing
formulae should be designed to improve
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regional equity. Aid allocation should follow
similar principles.
»» Aid

donors should assist governments to
identify types of expenditure that will reduce
inequalities, drawing on available data, light
surveys, and evidence from other countries.
Where capacity is a constraint, they should
provide technical assistance to integrate
distributional impacts into public expenditure
reviews and planning. Where willingness to
tackle inequalities is a constraint, they should
undertake policy dialogue and conditionality,
and direct their own resources to improving
horizontal and vertical equity.

Conclusion
The need to tackle horizontal inequality in postconflict policies is increasingly recognized.
Innovative policies can address this need.
Collecting data on inequalities will enable policy
makers to analyze the distributive impacts of the
fiscal system, and to devise tax and expenditure
polices to redress these biases. Aid donors have an
important role to play in ensuring a government’s
success in these efforts.
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Promoting Group
Justice: Fiscal Policies
in Post-Conflict
Countries
by Frances Stewart, Graham
Brown, and Alex Cobham1

This paper reviews the impact of fiscal policies
on inequality in post-conflict settings, and offers
proposals to integrate distributional concerns
better into policy making. We first review the
relationship of inequality to conflict, focusing on
the importance of “horizontal inequalities” across
groups that are culturally defined on the basis of
ethnicity, religion, race, or other attributes. After
considering how groups should be selected for
assessing horizontal inequalities, we examine
measurement and data issues. We then discuss
how tax and expenditure policies can contribute
to the goal of building a durable peace by helping
to reduce distributional inequalities.

Evidence supports the view that
“
horizontal inequalities (HIs) are often
a source of violent conflict.
”
Inequality and Conflict
While it seems plausible that high levels of
inequality generate resentment and fuel conflict,
the evidence on whether higher “vertical
inequality” between rich and poor in the society
as a whole increases the risk of violent intra-state
conflict is inconclusive.2 More evidence supports
the view that horizontal inequalities (HIs) are
often a source of violent conflict (Stewart 2000;
Mancini 2005; Østby 2006). Intergroup inequalities
generate powerful grievances that leaders can
1 Frances Stewart is the director of the Centre for Research on Inequality,
Human Security, and Ethnicity (CRISE) and professor of development
economics at the Department of International Development, University
of Oxford. Graham Brown is research officer for Southeast Asia at CRISE,
University of Oxford. Alex Cobham is supernumerary fellow in economics at
St. Anne’s College, Oxford. We are grateful for ideas and comments on previous
drafts from Arnim Langer, as well as Jim Boyce and members of his team.
2 For discussion, see Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Auvinen & Nafziger 1999;
and Lichbach 1989. Even so, it remains important to tackle severe vertical
inequality since it leads to high levels of poverty and is often associated with a
higher incidence of violent crime (Bourgignon 1999).

use to mobilize followers. Such mobilization is
especially likely where there is political as well
as economic inequality – where group leaders
are excluded from formal political power and
significant numbers of group members are
economically deprived. What matters most are not
objective inequalities but subjective perceptions
of inequality and unfairness.
Examples of countries and regions where HIs
appear to have been a factor in provoking violent
conflict include Côte d’Ivoire, Rwanda, Northern
Ireland, Nepal, Chiapas, and Sudan. The particular
type of inequality that provokes conflict varies
from one society to another – for example, land
was a major issue in the conflict between whites
and blacks in Zimbabwe, while in Northern Ireland
the conflict between Protestants and Catholics
centered more on housing and employment. Note
that it’s not only deprived groups who initiate
conflict – richer groups may to do so too to
preserve their privileges, as in the Biafran conflict
in Nigeria in 1967–70.
Fiscal policies can help. Taxation is particularly
relevant in addressing economic inequalities
and social inequalities that have some impact on
economic disparities. While most policies aimed at
political inequalities lie outside the fiscal system
(in constitutional arrangements, for example),
decentralization of the fiscal system can empower
local groups and thereby reduce political HIs.

The Scoping Exercise: Defining Groups
The first step in understanding the status and
dynamics of horizontal inequalities in a country is
to classify the relevant identity groups: the group
boundaries that people perceive as important and
on the basis of which discrimination or favoritism
occurs.

The first step in understanding the
“status
and dynamics of horizontal
inequalities in a country is to classify
the relevant identity groups.

”
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An initial in-depth investigation of the history and
political economy of the country in question will
suggest such delineations. If surveys of people’s
own perceptions of identity distinctions are
available, or if such a survey can be carried out,
this can provide valuable insights. Such surveys
ask people which groups they feel are privileged
or deprived, and which are favored or disfavored
by the government. They can also ask about the
importance of different aspects of identity to the
people themselves. Often, a “multiple approach,”
which examines a variety of group classifications
(e.g., ethnic, regional, and religious), is useful
because it highlights the main inequalities.
Apart from defining the conflict-relevant groups,
the scoping exercise also should address four
questions:
»» Are

the salient groups ranked hierarchically
– that is, most members of one group are
better off than the other group(s) – or are
they unranked, so that each group contains
comparable fractions of rich and poor
(Horowitz 1985)?

»»

Are groups geographically concentrated, or are
they dispersed?

»» Do

groups specialize in particular economic
activities (e.g., trading, subsistence farming, or
cash-crop farming)?

»» Is

the government politically inclined to
tackle inequalities, or does it wish to preserve
them? For the purposes of this discussion,
we can describe these types as “willing” and
“unwilling,” though in fact the situation
may not be so clear-cut. For example, the
government’s willingness may depend on how
supportive aid donors are of efforts to redress
inequalities. And there may be divisions within
the government on this issue.

Each of these questions is relevant for policy
design.

Measurement Issues
While there is a voluminous literature on the
measurement of vertical inequality, which has
/2/

given rise to well-known measures such as the
Gini coefficient, methods for measuring horizontal
inequality have only begun to receive much
attention. Here we review measurement issues for
both income and non-income dimensions of HI.
Horizontal inequality in incomes
Providing summary information on horizontal
inequality is more complex than summarizing
vertical inequality, precisely because we are now
concerned with groups. HI is most frequently
represented by the comparison of average per
capita incomes of different groups, but this
measure conceals distributional differences within
those groups.

most frequently represented
“HIbyisthe
comparison of average
per capita incomes of different
groups...how groups compare at
different points within an income
distribution may be important, too.

”

Yet from both a political and a policy perspective,
how groups compare at different points within
an income distribution may be important, too.
For example, consider the following scenarios, all
of which are consistent with a situation in which
Group A has a higher average income than Group B:
• Case 1: Group A outperforms Group B at every
income level.
• Case 2: The elite (say, the top 5%) of group A
has a higher income than the elite of group B, but
incomes are the same across the remainder of
their respective populations.
• Case 3: The elite and the middle class (say, top
60%) of both groups have similar incomes, but the
bottom 40% of group A has a significantly higher
income than its group B counterpart.
• Case 4: The elite of group A have a higher income
than their counterparts in group B, but the bottom
40% of group A have significantly lower incomes
than the bottom 40% of group B.

Public Finance in Post-Conflict Environments

From a political perspective, in Case 1, both the
elite and the masses of the lower-income group
have grievances, a situation that may make
rebellion more likely. Malaysia in the 1960s and
apartheid South Africa are examples. In Case 2,
the elite have a grievance but not the rest of the
population, so perhaps a rebellion is less likely.3 In
Case 3, the income parity among the upper- and
middle-income groups may reduce the likelihood
of violent conflict, unless the elite feel politically
disenfranchised or threatened, in which case they
may find it easy to mobilize support among the
lower-income groups. The Rwandan genocide in
1994 is an example. In Case 4, anti-elite resentments
in group B can translate into violence against the
poorest stratum of group A – a dynamic that has
been seen in Sri Lanka.
The differences are relevant from a policy
perspective, too. In the first case, policies are
needed both to increase entrepreneurial and civilservice opportunities at the top and to provide
basic services and economic opportunities to
the masses. In the second case, efforts to reduce
tensions should be focused on elites. In the third
and fourth cases, it is a matter of improving the
position of poorer members of the group.

These two measures are illustrated below with
reference to Christian-Muslim disparities in the
Indonesian province of Maluku in 1995, shortly
before religious conflict broke out there. The ratio
of average Muslim household income to average
Christian household income in the province was
0.91. Figure 1a shows the relative representation
of Muslims in each income decile, indicating that
Muslims were under-represented (relative to their
share in the province’s total population) in the top
five deciles and over-represented in the poorer
deciles, except the very poorest decile, where they
were slightly under-represented. Figure 1b shows
the ratio of average incomes of the two groups
by decile. The middle eight deciles of Muslims
were poorer than their Christian counterparts.
But the top 10% of Muslims had somewhat higher
average incomes than the top 10% of Christians,
a relationship that was disguised by the fact that
Muslims were under-represented in the top decile
of the population as a whole.
Figure 1a:
Population Shares in Maluku, Indonesia, 1995

In addition to average per capita income, therefore,
group distributional data are necessary. Such data
can be presented in two useful ways:
»» Compare

the proportions of each group in
each income quantile relative to its proportion
in the overall population. This method reveals
by how much particular groups are over- or
under-represented at different points in the
income distribution.

Figure 1b:
income ratios in Maluku, Indonesia, 1995

»» Estimate the ratios of average incomes between

two groups for each decile or quintile.

3 The Calabar region in Nigeria is one area where the elites of the Quas and
Efuts felt disadvantaged compared with the Efiks in political appointments
and business opportunities, but the mass population felt they were equally
treated with respect to employment and amenities. No conflict occurred in
Calabar, while neighboring Warri, where both elites and the general population
perceived HIs, has experienced recurrent violent conflicts. For discussion, see
Ukiwo 2006.

Source for Figures 1a and 1b: Authors’ calculations from 1995 Indonesian
Inter-Censual Survey.
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Investigations of the socio-economic roots of the
conflict in Maluku have identified the erosion
of the dominance of the Christian population
– which had been privileged by the colonial
regime – as a source of grievance. The tension
issued from two particular areas:: friction between
indigenous Christian farmers and their largely
Muslim transmigrant counterparts; and resentment
among Christian elites about the increasing
preference given to Muslims by Jakarta (e.g.,
Brown et al. 2005). The data support that analysis:
while Christian incomes remained around 10%
higher than those of Muslims overall, they had
fallen below Muslim incomes at the bottom and
top ends of the distribution curve. In the end, the
conflict engulfed many more people, but the initial
tensions emerged precisely at those points in the
income distribution curve.

Where the data permit, it is desirable
“
to compare performance in non-income

”

dimensions of HIs across the distribution.
Non-income dimensions of inequality

Evidence on the dimensions of HIs unconnected
to income is also necessary. To plan public
expenditures, policy makers need to know where
the main problem lies. Is it, for instance, a matter of
inadequate access to education, or poor economic
opportunities, or both? Does access to land or
employment levels show the sharper inequalities,
and which is more important to people? Data are
often scarce in postwar settings, but certain areas
that are fundamental to well-being should have
priority for data collection. Apart from income,
these include land and other assets; employment;
educational access at various levels; and health
statistics such as infant and child mortality.
Where the data permit, it is again desirable to
compare performance in these non-income
dimensions across the distribution, rather than rely
simply on comparisons of average performance.
Data issues
Socio-economic data broken down by the relevant
ethno-cultural categories are often sparse.
Sometimes – as, for example, in Nigeria – ethno-
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cultural variables are not included in surveys
because of their political sensitivity (Okolo 1999).
For quick assessment, it may be necessary to use
some other characteristic as a proxy for ethnocultural difference. Two such options are region
and language.
Regional data are often more readily available. The
degree to which they are useful for HI assessment
depends on the extent to which identity groups
are geographically segregated. As a rule of thumb,
region is a useful proxy if more than half the
members of the relatively deprived group are
concentrated in the targeted region while less than
half of the privileged group are in the targeted
region. In many African countries, ethnic and
religious groups are regionally concentrated, so
regional inequality may be a suitable proxy. And in
some cases, region itself defines group identities.
An alternative proxy is language, on which
information sometimes is available where ethnic
variables are not – as in Indonesian surveys in the
New Order period. Comparison of Indonesian
language statistics at the district level with ethnic
data that became available at a later date shows
close correlations, suggesting that language is
an effective proxy for ethnicity in this context
(Mancini 2005). Similarly, language is often used as
a marker for indigenous identity in Latin America
(see, for example, Beckett and Pebley 2002). It is
important to note, however, that in some contexts,
language may not be an appropriate proxy,
particularly where divisions are religious rather
than ethnic – as in Northern Ireland, for instance.
The first need in any country is to conduct an
inventory of available data. Potential data sources
include:
»» Census

data and other official surveys, such as
household expenditure surveys, which often
include ethnicity or language, and sometimes
religion.

»» Demographic

and health surveys (DHS), many
of which include ethnic identification along
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with information on access to social services
and ownership of domestic assets.
»» Regional

data from the census, household
surveys, and public expenditure accounts.

»» Specific

sectoral data (e.g., from schools and
hospitals), which often contain ethnic and
regional information.

Urgent data gaps can be filled by conducting “light”
surveys and using focus groups.4
Proposal 1a: Where data needed to measure
horizontal inequalities are not available (or highly
inadequate), small-scale household surveys should
be conducted to assess inter-group disparities in
(a) asset ownership, (b) employment, (c) incomes,
(d) education, and (e) health and nutrition.
Proposal 1b: Where conflict-relevant group
boundaries are not evident, perceptions surveys
should be conducted on attitudes toward identities
and inequalities.
Proposal 1c: In addition to regional and linguistic
categorizations, statistical offices should be
encouraged to include ethnic, religious, or racial
categorization (if relevant and politically feasible)
in subsequent data collection.

Tax Policies
Key tasks for tax policies in post-conflict settings
are to mobilize revenue and to address inequality.
The two are related, since perceptions of inequity
in tax policies undermine their legitimacy, deter
voluntary compliance, and thereby impede
revenue mobilization. Here our focus is on policies
to redress inequality. 5
Although horizontal inequalities are often defined
in terms of religious, ethnic, or racial categories,
it is undesirable to make tax liability dependent
4 Fuji (2006) discusses a variety of approaches to rapid poverty mapping.
A Core Welfare Indicator Survey (CWIQ) can be designed quickly and
inexpensively to identify access to public services from the perspective of the
user (McKay 2004; Reinikka and Svensson 2004).

on a person’s religious, ethnic, or racial identity.
To do so would risk strengthening group divisions
as well as violating basic principles of tax equity.
Nevertheless, tax policies can be designed to
promote horizontal equality. This can be done
by increasing the (vertical) progressivity of the
tax structure and by identifying taxes that will
bear more heavily on privileged groups than on
deprived ones.

policies can be designed to promote
“Tax
horizontal equality…by increasing the
(vertical) progressivity of the tax structure
and by identifying taxes that will bear
more heavily on privileged groups.

”

Increasing the progressivity of the tax structure
Progressive taxation – that is, policies that tax a
higher percentage of the incomes of the rich than
of the poor – will usually improve HIs as well as
reduce vertical inequality. Indeed, they will always
do so where the groups are ranked hierarchically,
such that for each decile the income level of the
deprived group(s) is below that of the privileged
group(s). This situation is fairly common – for
example, it generally holds for indigenous groups
in Latin America.
Direct taxes on income, profits, and capital gains
are typically the most progressive component of
any tax system. In the immediate post-conflict
environment, the administrative requirements of
direct taxes often make it difficult to rely heavily
on them.To the extent that they can be introduced,
however, they will help to ensure progressivity in
subsequent years.
Property taxes are also usually progressive. The
extent of the progressivity depends, of course,
on the design of the tax and the rates charged.
Even flat rate property taxes are progressive,
however, because poor people (groups) have
very little property: asset inequality usually
exceeds income inequality. A simple approach to
improving progressivity further is to exempt all
property below a certain value. Property taxes

5 Issues of revenue mobilization in post-conflict countries are discussed in a
companion policy brief by Michael Carnahan (2006).
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are particularly appropriate in post-conflict
reconstruction because government expenditure
to maintain and build a durable peace is likely
to generate significant returns for those holding
property.
Indirect taxes can also be progressive if properly
designed. Import duties and value-added taxes can
include exemptions for basic necessities and higher
rates for luxury goods. Specific excise duties can
target luxuries as well. Other progressive indirect
taxes include motor-vehicle duties and taxes on
airline flights. Fuel taxes can be differentiated so
as to tax more heavily the sort of fuels that richer
people use (petrol) than those poor people do
(kerosene).

taxes are particularly
“Property
appropriate in post-conflict
reconstruction because government
expenditure to maintain and
build a durable peace is likely to
generate significant returns for
those holding property.

”

Proposal 2: Increase the progressivity of the tax
system by (a) increasing the role and progressivity
of direct taxes and property taxes and (b) increasing
the progressivity of indirect taxes by raising rates
on luxuries and exempting basic goods consumed
by the poor.
Identifying taxes that will bear more heavily
on privileged groups than on deprived ones
Where people live, what they produce, and
what they consume are markers of their group
identity. These differences make it possible to use
tax policies to reduce HIs by differentiating on
the basis of location, productive activities, and
consumption behavior:
Efforts to change the regional
balance of net revenue can improve HIs
where groups are regionally concentrated.
In federal states, where tax rates can be
varied by region, the formula that determines

»» Location:
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central government tax rates can be designed
to improve the situation of poorer regions.
Region-specific tax exemptions, which some
European countries use to promote regional
development, can do the job as well.
activities: Specialized production
gives rise to possibilities for designing taxes
to differentiate among groups. In Ghana, for
example, groups that are more privileged than
subsistence producers and northern farmers
produce cocoa, so taxing cocoa production
would help group distribution. In settings
where most people in the informal sector are
of a different ethnic group from those in the
government and formal sector – as, for example,
in Niger (Barlow and Snyder, 1993: 1187-8) –
taxes on the formal sector will reduce HI.

»» Production

»» Consumption behavior: Consumption patterns

provide another avenue for tax differentiation.
For example, user fees designed to fall on
services that poorer groups use little (such as
higher education or large-farm irrigation) can
yield beneficial results.

Transparency and fairness require
“
public debate on tax policies, publicly
disseminated rules, simplicity in
the system, and a minimum of
discretionary exemptions.

”

Proposal 3: Design indirect taxes to bear more
heavily on privileged groups, by introducing
taxes or increasing rates on geographic areas and
production and consumption activities in which
such groups are concentrated.
Although we have identified a range of tax
policies that could assist in reducing HIs, the
main contribution of the tax system in this
effort is in raising the revenues with which to
undertake HI-reducing expenditures. Attention
to the distributional incidence of taxation is also
important, however, in order to avoid a sense
of unfair treatment by groups. Transparency
and fairness require public debate on tax
policies, publicly disseminated rules, simplicity
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in the system, and a minimum of discretionary
exemptions.

Expenditure Policies
People benefit from public expenditure by three
routes:
Route 1: Contracts and employment in
constructing public facilities.
Route 2: Contracts and employment in
delivering services.
Route 3: Access to services.
The distributional incidence of each is important.
The first route is quantitatively significant, since
public investment frequently accounts for threequarters or more of total investment in poor
countries. The second route is also important,
as government employment often accounts for
over half of total formal-sector employment. And
the third route determines who benefits from
government services, such as health and education,
that are important both in themselves and because
they contribute to improved incomes.
Many analyses of the distributional impact of
public expenditure focus only on Route 3. This is
insufficient, not only because of the quantitative
importance of the first two routes, but because of
their high visibility and political sensitivity.6 Routes
1 and 2 may have particularly strong effects on the
distribution of opportunities and incomes among
the upper-income strata of the population.
Contracts and employment
In the allocation of contracts and employment,
choices are limited by enterprise and skill level,
affording little scope for changing vertical
inequality (VI) significantly. The choice of
technique can influence VI – for example, laborintensive construction techniques offer more
jobs to low-skilled and low-income people –
6 For example, in both Ghana and Nigeria a much higher proportion of
people believe that their ethnicity affects their chances of getting government
jobs and contracts than access to public services (Langer and Ukiwo 2006).

but efficiency considerations tend to override
distributional ones in the awarding of contracts
and hiring, which may help explain why these are
often ignored in the analysis of the distributional
incidence of public expenditure.
The situation is very different for horizontal
inequality. Contracts and employment are often
biased in their racial distribution (e.g., in South
Africa under apartheid), religious distribution (e.g.,
in Northern Ireland), or ethnic distribution (e.g.,
in Kenya and Sri Lanka). Regional location may
also be biased. Hence fairness in the distribution
of contracts and employment in the public sector
is crucial in formulating public policy to address
HI.
Policies to achieve greater fairness include
competitive and transparent bidding procedures
for contracts; ”fair” employment legislation
and rules; and careful monitoring of allocation
coupled with policies to counter disproportionate
allocations, such as technical assistance to
disadvantaged groups and, when necessary, quotas
for contracts and government employment.

Hence fairness in the distribution
“
of contracts and employment in the
public sector is crucial in formulating
public policy to address HI.

”

Proposal 4: In the construction of facilities and
delivery of services, allocation of contracts and
employment should explicitly consider fairness
among groups. Policies to promote this may include
competitive and transparent bidding procedures
for contracts; “fair” employment legislation and
rules; and technical assistance and possibly quotas
to ensure equitable distribution.
Access to public services
Turning to the distributional impact of access to
services, it is helpful to differentiate among five
types of public expenditure:
• Expenditure with allocable inter-regional and
intra-regional benefits: Most public expenditure
benefits particular people in particular regions
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(for example, expenditure on social services
or economic infrastructure). Redirection of
this expenditure toward deprived regions and
groups can do much to redress both horizontal
and vertical inequalities.7
• Expenditure with non-allocable benefits:
In principle, expenditure on ”pure public
goods,” whose impacts affect the whole
population equally, benefits poorer groups
disproportionately in relation to their incomes.
In practical terms, such goods are few and far
between, so they generally cannot be relied
upon to bring about significant redistribution.
• Expenditure with allocable benefits across
groups but not across regions: Goods and
services that have national benefits for people
with particular characteristics – for example,
subsidies for national airlines that benefit
only those who fly, or radio broadcasts in a
specific language benefiting only speakers of
that language – potentially have important
distributional impacts. Ensuring that such
expenditures are fairly distributed can be a
significant way of improving horizontal equity.
• Expenditure with allocable benefits across
regions but not intra-regionally: Expenditures
that benefit everyone in a particular geographic
area (for example, expenditure to improve
environmental quality) can contribute to
changing HIs where groups are regionally
concentrated.
• Transfer payments: Transfer payments – that is,
direct payments to communities, households,
or individuals based on particular criteria such
as income or age – typically are designed to
reduce vertical inequality. They can also be
designed to affect HI: either directly, by making
group membership a criterion (which might
be regarded as undesirable in some cases), or
indirectly, by using allocation criteria that favor
deprived groups, such as income, size of family,
employment status, or education status.
7 Regrettably, the overall record of policies toward regional development
has not been good in terms of reducing disparities, although they may have
prevented gaps from widening farther (Shankar and Shah 2003).
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In federal and decentralized systems, resource
transfers from the central government to states or
districts can reduce inequality. Nigeria, for example,
has an equalizing element in its revenue-sharing
formula: in one version, 30% of state allocations
were distributed equally among the states, 40%
according to population, 15% (inversely) with
social development, and 5% according to local tax
effort (Ahmad and Singh 2003). Similarly, following
the 2001 “Big Bang” decentralization in Indonesia,
one-third of consolidated government expenditure
was devolved to the districts, according to a
formula based on expenditure needs and fiscal
capacities; this, in theory at least, involved major
redistribution to poorer districts.8
In post-conflict contexts, aid frequently finances
a very large proportion of expenditure on public
services. Thus it is vital that aid donors, as well
as governments, take these considerations into
account – both in their policy dialogue with
the government and in projects they undertake
directly (Stewart and Brown 2006). The relevant
expenditure
arenas
include
disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and
security sector reform (SSR), both of which are
large in most post-conflict situations.
Malaysia provides an instructive example of the
successful use of fiscal policy to address HIs in a
post-conflict setting. A serious outbreak of violence
in 1969 led to the introduction of a set of policies
to improve HIs in the 1970s. These addressed all
three aspects of public expenditure, and included
not only the redirection of expenditure but also
quotas in government employment and contracts
to improve the position of the relatively deprived
Malays among both the elite and the masses. These
policies successfully reduced HIs, contributing to
a period of sustained peace.
In Mozambique, in contrast, the need to correct
HIs was not recognized during post-conflict
reconstruction. Although reconstruction has
been successful in other respects, HIs have been
accentuated, for government services and aid
8 Expenditure needs were determined by population, area, poverty (later
replaced by the inverse of the Human Development Index and regional per
capita income), and costs (Hofman et al. 2006).

Public Finance in Post-Conflict Environments

distribution are strongly skewed toward the
South. So far, however, this situation has not led to
renewed outbreaks of violence, in part because it
occurred in a context of overall growth in incomes
and services (Stewart 2006).
Proposal 5: The distributional impacts of public
services should be monitored, and allocations
targeted to ensure greater horizontal and vertical
equity by targeting pro-poor sectors, activities
within sectors, and locations. In federal or
decentralized systems, revenue-sharing formulae
should be designed to improve regional equity. Aid
allocation should follow similar principles.
Process issues
Few policy makers have detailed information
about the distributional incidence of public
expenditure.9 But this is no reason to wait for
improved information before acting. Rather, it
suggests that use should be made of whatever
information is available, including quick surveys
and evidence from other countries. Abundant
evidence from around the world indicates,
for example, that the benefits from primary
educational expenditure are more equally
distributed than those from secondary or tertiary
schooling. Similarly, construction of trunk roads in
relatively rich areas is likely to be regressive while
building feeder roads in relatively poor areas is
likely to be progressive. Even with very limited
knowledge of a particular country, enough is often
known to improve the distributional incidence of
public expenditure.
Governments may lack capacity to respond to
inequality in a post-conflict environment. Their
capacities to monitor inequality, analyze tax
and public expenditure incidence, and institute
targeted programs to benefit deprived groups is
often weak. Technical assistance to build these
capacities is needed.
Apart from capacity constraints, governments may
be unwilling to address inequalities for a number
9 Studies of benefit incidence in a range of countries give some guidance on
how different types of expenditure affect VI, but not HI (see the survey by Chu
et al., 2004). For discussion of the limitations of benefit-incidence studies, see
McKay (2004).

of reasons. In some cases, political leaders and
government officials may be unaware of the true
extent of horizontal disparities, or they may take
the view that generic pro-poor policies constitute
a sufficient response to address horizontal
inequality. In other cases, governments may be
deliberately exclusionary.
The case of an exclusionary government presents
the most difficult case for external assistance actors.
Three responses are appropriate: first, informal
policy dialogue and formal policy conditionality
to strengthen incentives for government efforts
to reduce inequality; second, project and sectoral
support directed to the deprived groups; and
third, promotion of other objectives acceptable to
the government that will assist the poorer groups,
such as comprehensive education and health
services. Because aid flows are often large relative
to domestic revenue, donors can make a major
contribution to overcoming inequalities in public
expenditure.10

An exclusionary government
“
presents the most difficult case
for external assistance actors.
”
Proposal 6: Aid donors should assist governments
to identify types of expenditure that will reduce
inequalities, drawing on available data, light
surveys, and evidence from other countries. Where
capacity is a constraint, they should provide
technical assistance to integrate distributional
impacts into public expenditure reviews and
planning. Where willingness to tackle inequalities
is a constraint, they should undertake policy
dialogue and conditionality, and direct their own
resources to improving horizontal and vertical
equity.

Conclusions
This paper has argued that tackling inequality,
particularly horizontal inequality, deserves an
important place in post-conflict policies. The
need to tackle inequalities has been recognized
10 See Stewart and Brown (2006) for further discussion of how aid can be
used to reduce HIs.
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explicitly in some recent peace agreements
– for example, in Guatemala and Sudan – but
implementation of measures to redress them has
been problematic. At present, policies to redress
horizontal inequalities do not form part of the
standard development or reconstruction agendas
of the international financial institutions and other
external assistance providers. Since aid donors play
such an important role in post-conflict situations,
their own acceptance and implementation of
the need to tackle inequalities can have a major
impact.

Since aid donors play such an
“important
role in post-conflict
situations, their own acceptance and
implementation of the need to tackle
inequalities can have a major impact.

”

An important component of policies towards
inequality is the collection of the data needed
to measure the nature and extent of inequalities
and to analyze the distributive impact of the
fiscal system. Although the appropriate data are
often not readily available, this does not present
an insuperable problem, as enough is generally
known, or can be rapidly collected, to identify
appropriate policies.
The paper has outlined a variety of ways in which
tax and expenditure policies can affect inequality.
For example, improving the progressivity of
taxation will reduce vertical inequality and also
usually reduce horizontal inequality. Regional tax
and expenditure policies can redress HI where
deprived groups are regionally concentrated.
Within regions, tax and expenditure can be
designed to help deprived groups. The Malaysian
case illustrates how such policies can be effective
in reducing horizontal inequalities.
Politically, it is easier to redirect expenditure
to deprived groups if this can be done out of
increased total expenditure, rather than at the
direct expense of better-off groups. At the same
time, it is easier to mobilize increased resources
if taxation is perceived to be equitable and if the
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public believes it will receive services from the
government in return. For both reasons, the goals
of increasing revenue and reducing inequality are
complementary.
An appropriately designed fiscal system should be
able to contribute substantially to the reduction
of inequality, if this is desired by the government.
Where it is not, it is naturally more difficult to
implement inequality-reducing policies effectively.
In both cases, however, aid donors have an
important role to play. Where the government has
the requisite political will, donors can provide
technical assistance to build capacity to analyze
and redress inequalities. Where political will is
lacking, donors may not be able to change firmly
held positions of the government in power, but they
can draw attention to the need to monitor and take
action to reduce inequalities, as well as help collect
relevant data, request that public expenditure
reviews incorporate equity considerations, and
ensure that their own assistance contributes to
correcting inequalities.
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